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THE IMPACT OF NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT ON EFFICIENCY: AN ANALYSIS OF 
MADRID’S HOSPITALS 
Abstract 
Madrid has emerged at the vanguard of public healthcare reform in the European Union.  
Despite the fact that the introduction of New Public Management (NPM) into Madrid hospitals 
has gone further than elsewhere in the EU – sparking controversy —   little scholarship has been 
done to test whether NPM actually led to technical efficiency. This paper is one of the first 
attempts to do so. We deploy a bootstrapped Data Envelopment Analysis to compare efficiency 
scores in traditionally managed hospitals and those operating with new management formulas. 
We do not find evidence that NPM hospitals are more efficient than traditionally managed ones. 
Moreover, our results suggest that what actually matters may be the management itself, not the 
management model.  
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THE IMPACT OF NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT ON EFFICIENCY: AN ANALYSIS OF 
MADRID’S HOSPITALS 
1. Introduction 
New Public Management (NPM) policies have been introduced across most OECD countries 
from the 1980s, in response to concerns about rising healthcare expenditures, fueled by 
technological and medical advances in treatment, as well as an aging population (Acerete et al. 
2011; Simonet, 2013). In Spain, NPM reforms were first introduced into the healthcare system 
from the early 1980s, in parallel with political decentralization
1
. Decentralization allowed 
Spain´s 17 regional governments to gain autonomy as regards decisions to introduce or 
reinforce NPM into healthcare, including the adaptation of new hospital management models, 
such as different forms of Public Private Partnership (PPP) (Petmesidou and Guillén, 2008). 
Since then, regional governments in Spain have increasingly introduced NPM reforms into 
healthcare, particularly in Catalonia and, at an accelerated rate, in Madrid (Gallo and Gené-
Badia, 2013). We argue Madrid is now positioning itself at the vanguard of NPM healthcare 
implementation in the context of the European Union. 
 
This paper focuses on the reform of hospitals belonging to the Madrid Regional Health Service 
(SERMAS). After first emulating healthcare reforms in the UK, Madrid has now overtaken the 
British model, particularly as regards the use of new hospital management formulas, through the 
implementation of purchaser/provider split, use of PPPs, contracting out and the introduction of 
competition between hospitals. Moreover, reforms in Madrid have gained increased traction 
during the ongoing economic and financial crises. Nevertheless, the implementation of 
healthcare reform has been controversial and witnessed widespread protest by citizens and 
professionals. In particular, the ongoing attempt to contract out clinical services delivery in six 
public hospitals has sparked popular criticism (Legido-Quigley et al., 2013). A popular 
movement formed by doctors, nursing staff and citizens — the so-called “white tide” — took 
the streets in Madrid several times from November 2012, but, despite the massive popular 
opposition, the contracting out plan is still going ahead (Garcia Rada, 2013).  
 
                                                     
1
 Decentralization took place during the 1980s and 1990s, transferring powers in healthcare management 
gradually across the different Spanish regions, firstly to Catalonia (1981), Andalucia (1984), the Basque 
Country and Valencia (1987), Galicia and Navarra (1990) and the Canary Islands (1993). The healthcare 
decentralization process ended in January 2002, in which the devolution of autonomy and power from the 
central government to all regional governments was completed (Petmesidou and Guillen, 2008). 
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Policy-makers and scholars have argued that NPM techniques would increase efficiency in the 
health care sector, by introducing criteria from private sector management into traditional 
methods of public administration (Mayston, 1999). In the Spanish context, policymakers have 
used repeatedly the efficiency improvement argument to introduce new management formulas 
in healthcare delivery (Garcia Rada, 2011).  
 
Theory suggests that NPM-related policies may enhance the efficiency of public service 
delivery, such as healthcare provision (for a comprehensive overview of NPM and efficiency, 
see Andrews, 2013). However, the benefits of NPM-related tools in healthcare delivery have 
been already questioned from an international perspective (see, for example, Ferrari, 2006; 
Pollock et al., 2011; Acerete et al., 2012; Barlow et al., 2013). Moreover, there is no clear 
evidence supporting efficiency gains as regards the use of new management formulas in Spain
2
, 
which is adding fuel to an already heated debate in relation to the pros and cons of introducing 
new management formulas in public hospitals.  
 
To avoid ideological positions by turning to empirical evidence, the central aim of this paper is 
to evaluate whether the NPM reforms implemented in the SERMAS hospitals’ network are 
indeed associated with efficiency gains. To do so, this paper carries out a comparative analysis 
of the performance of traditionally managed hospitals and those adopting new management 
formulas, for hospitals belonging to the SERMAS in the year 2009. We assess the relative 
hospitals’ efficiency by means of standard Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) techniques and a 
DEA-bootstrap approach, followed by a second-stage consisting of a statistical analysis to 
assess differences in efficiency scores between the two groups by means of a Mann-Whitney U 
test and an analysis of DEA bootstrapped confidence intervals.  
 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to analyze efficiency differences between 
traditionally managed hospitals and those ones operating under new management formulas in 
Madrid. Thus, this paper sheds new light on the current debate about the use of new forms of 
public hospitals’ management in Spain. One reason for this lack of empirical evidence may be 
the opacity of the Spanish NHS; although there is a considerable amount of information on 
Spanish hospitals in public databases, data is anonymised, making it difficult to identify 
hospitals and thus, to identify the management model. To overcome this problem, we crossed 
two different databases to extract individual hospital information (for a detailed explanation see 
the Data and Methodology section).  
                                                     
2
 For an overview about the empirical evidence as regards the use of new management formulas in the 
Spanish NHS, see Sanchez et al. (2013). 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The second section synthesizes the main NPM-
style policies implemented in Spanish hospitals, with a particular focus on Madrid. Section 3 
describes the data and the methodology used for inference. Section 4 reports the analysis results 
and interprets them. Section 5 concludes, summarizing our findings, their policy implications 
and possible directions for further research.  
2. New hospital management models 
In 1996, the government of the ruling conservative Popular Party (Partido Popular) approved 
Royal Decree 10/1996
3
 allowing for the use of new hospital management models, with the 
explicit aim of “introducing more flexible organizational formulas, in order to meet the demands 
of efficiency and social profitability of public resources”. Soon afterwards, Law 15/1997 — the 
result of the parliamentary processing of Royal Decree 10/1996 — stated that provision and 
management of health services could be carried out also through agreements or contracts with 
public or private entities. This allowed for the entry of private providers into public healthcare 
delivery.  
 
As a consequence, the process of introduction of NPM-related policies in public healthcare 
services began across Spanish regions. By 2002, when powers in healthcare management were 
fully transferred to all Spanish regions, Madrid had emerged at the vanguard of NPM 
implementation in healthcare
4
. Here, two main actions were taken as regards hospital 
management: (i) Introduction of market-driven mechanisms through the separation of purchaser 
and provider, with the aim of transforming the public hospital network into a large number of 
smaller firms, with greater autonomy, their own legal status and, in competition with other 
hospitals, similar to the UK's hospital trusts (Bayle and Beiras, 2001:141) and, (ii) contracting 
out some or all hospital services, including clinic services. As a result, there are currently five 
different new management models in the SERMAS hospitals, including private or semi-private 
formulas, in addition to the so-called traditional direct management (ADM) model: public 
enterprises; foundations; PFI models with a public enterprise managing clinic services and 
outsourced non-clinic services to private companies; PPP models with full private management; 
and contracts with privately owned hospitals. 
 
                                                     
3
 Royal Decree 10/1996 about new management formulas of the Spanish NHS. 
4
 Through the implementation of Law on Health Organization of the Community of Madrid (LOSCAM-
Law 12/2001). 
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Table 1 summarizes the different management models coexisting in Madrid and their main 
characteristics. Briefly, ADM hospitals are directly managed by regional governments; they do 
not enjoy — usually — of own legal status and they are ruled by public law. In addition to this 
model, there are the so-called new management models (NMM), including both forms of direct 
(public) and non-direct (private) service delivery. Within the first (direct management), we have 
public enterprises and foundations. They are configured as organizations with legal personality, 
ruled by private law and may be subject —if reflected in their statutes — to labor legislation to 
manage their staff, considered as key features to increase flexibility and autonomy (Martin, 
2003). Non-direct management formulas include contracting with private companies and 
different forms of PPP. As regards the first formula, healthcare contracting consists of an 
administrative contract whereby healthcare services are provided through privately owned 
facilities. Regarding the different forms of PPPs, in Madrid there are two models; the UK’s PFI 
model and an indigenous version, the so-called “Alzira” model.  PFI models involve long-term 
arrangements between the public and private sectors, whereby the private sector finances the 
hospital building and then delivers non-clinical services over a period of around 30 years 
(Hellowell and Pollock, 2009; Acerete et al., 2011). The “Alzira” model is a PPP model which 
goes further, since the private sector finances, constructs and operates the physical hospital 
infrastructure, but also is in charge of clinical services delivery (Acerete et al. 2011).   
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Table 1. Main characteristics of SERMAS hospitals. 







Clinic unit with no legal 




Public Law Statutory regime 
New Management Model Public Enterprise Public 
(direct) 
Private law Labor legislation** 
New Management Model Foundation Public 
(direct) 
Private law Labor legislation 
New Management Model Contracting Private 
(indirect) 
Private law Labor legislation 
New Management Model PFI Mixed* 
(indirect) 
Private law Labor legislation 
New Management Model “Alzira” model Private 
(indirect) 
Private law Labor legislation 
Notes: *Private sector delivers non-clinic services while public sector delivers clinic services through a public 
enterprise. **Subject to labor legislation except if reflected on its statutes subjection to statutory regime 
 
In the Spanish context, the use of these new management models aimed to increase the health 
system efficiency. This would occur firstly by solving the perceived problems caused by public 
law and statutory personnel regime (Martin, 2003). Public law and civil servant statutory regime 
were considered two key obstacles to achieve efficiency gains, since it was believed that public 
law was too rigid to promote the system dynamism and statutory regime prevented to 
incorporate productivity and efficiency tools, such as performance related pay, into personnel 
management (Informe Abril, 1991). Secondly, the separation of purchaser and provider aimed to 
promote the creation of an internal market and the disaggregation of public sector units. It has 
been suggested that the separation purchaser / provider helps to improve efficiency, by 
introducing market incentives into the public healthcare sector management (Street, 1994) and 
the introduction of contracts (Gallego, 2000). Moreover, disaggregation of public sector units is 
considered a fundamental tool to make former monolithic and over-bureaucratized organizations 
become more flexible, controllable and manageable by professional managers (Andrews, 2013).  
In addition, allowing the entry of private providers was supposed to have positive effects as 
regards efficiency improvements because of the relatively superior efficiency of the private 
sector over the public one, a view which justified much of the privatization movement (Clifton 
et al, 2006). A key argument when explaining the perceived superior efficiency of the private 
sector is the view that private firms may have more incentives to innovate because, unlike the 
public sector, innovations may generate benefits (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). 
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Based on these arguments, this paper will focus on the following research question: are new 
management formulas more efficient than traditional ones as regards hospital management? To 
answer this question, we turn now to the data and methodology of our study. 
3. Data and methodology 
The data 
The data used in this study was obtained from the Spanish Hospital Survey (ESRI)
5
 for the year 
2009, and data provided by the Ministry of Health of the Community of Madrid
6
. Because ESRI 
files are anonymised micro-data, we obtained hospital names by contrasting resources data from 
the ESRI with the Spanish National Catalogue of Hospitals
7
. We have considered only year 
2009 because it was the first with fully available information for all PFI models.  It was also the 
last year available when writing this paper. 
 
In 2009, there were 33 hospitals belonging to the SERMAS. From the initial sample of 33 
hospitals, we excluded psychiatric, children, geriatrics and long stay hospitals, in order to work 
with a relatively homogeneous sample, which is crucial in a DEA analysis. The final sample 
consists of 25 public hospitals, including 14 operating under a traditional ADM model and 11 
considered NMM. 
Measuring technical efficiency and methodology 
When talking about public sector efficiency, and thus public healthcare efficiency, one may 
distinguish three dimensions of efficiency; allocative, distributive and productive or technical 
(Andrews, 2013). Clearly, a full-scale, comprehensive evaluation of the efficiency of new 
management formulas in the healthcare system would require evaluation of all three efficiency 
dimensions but, because of lack of reliable data, we focus only in one of those dimensions for 
which we have enough data; productive or technical efficiency. The concept of technical 
efficiency reflects the seminal notion of efficiency by Farrell (1957): Input oriented efficiency 
indicates the ability of each Decision Making Unit (DMU) (in our case hospitals) to minimize 
input consumption for a given level of output, while - alternatively – output oriented efficiency 
indicates the ability of each DMU to maximize the output within a certain fixed level of inputs. 
In this paper, we propose to apply the DEA methodology initially developed by Charnes et al. 
(1978) - and extended by Banker (1984) and Banker et al. (1984) - to assess the relative 
                                                     
5
 Retrieved from: http://www.msssi.gob.es/estadisticas/microdatos.do 
6
 Retrieved from: http://cmbd.sanidadmadrid.org/ 
7
 Retrieved from: http://www.msssi.gob.es/estadisticas/microdatos.do 
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technical efficiency of the sample of 25 hospitals belonging to the SERMAS. In the hospital 
sector, DEA methods have been the most common approach when measuring technical 
efficiency (Hollingsworth 2003, 2008).  
 
Briefly, the DEA methodology is an extension of linear programming which allows us to 
develop an efficient frontier for each DMU. The DEA estimation procedure consists of solving 
for each DMU an optimization problem via linear programming. The efficient frontier is 
represented by convex combinations of efficient DMUs. The rest of inefficient firms or DMUs 
are "wrapped" by the efficient frontier considering that deviations from the efficient frontier are 
due to technical inefficiency. One of the main advantages of the DEA methodology is that it 
allows considering multiple inputs and outputs simultaneously, which makes it particularly 
attractive in the case of hospitals. Additionally, it requires no assumptions about the functional 
form of the production frontier, which reduces the theoretical needs when specifying the model 
(Tiemann and Schreyögg, 2009). 
 
The first question that arises when selecting the model is its orientation, in the sense that either 
the inputs or outputs are considered exogenous and beyond the control of hospital management 
(Arocena and Garcia-Prado, 2007). Following O'Neill et al. (2008), hospital managers and 
policymakers have, in general, greater control over the level of inputs than output. O `Neill et al. 
(2008) also argued that, in most countries, the emphasis is more on controlling costs rather than 
on  increasing demand of health services, which seems to be the case of Madrid. Based on these 
arguments we consider that an input orientation is the most suitable for our study.  
 
A second question of interest when formulating the model is the returns to scale assumption. In 
this paper, we assume Variable Returns to Scale (VRS), which seems appropriate when it is not 
feasible to assume that all DMUs are operating at an optimal scale (Banker et al, 1984). 
Following Jacobs et al. (2006) and Tiemann and Schreyögg (2009), in the hospital sector issues 
such as imperfect competition, budgetary constraints and/or regulatory constraints may result in 
DMUs operating at an inefficient scale size, thus assuming constant returns to scale may be a 
strong assumption. 
 
Another concern when selecting our model is that DEA models require a careful selection of 
inputs and outputs, so the selection of variables is another crucial step when implementing DEA 
methods. The selection of inputs and outputs has been conditioned by our sample size
8
, and 
                                                     
8
 Following Cooper et al. (2007:116) a rough “rule of thumb” is to keep the number of DMUs equal to or 
greater than }.  
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variable selection was based on previous studies (see O'Neill et al., 2008). As inputs, we have 
used the number of beds, number of full-time employed physicians and the number of full-time 
nursing staff. The number of beds is a proxy for hospital size and capital investment and has 
been the most widely used input in hospital efficiency studies. The number of physicians and 
nursing staff are proxies for hospitals’ labor and human capital. 
 
As outputs, we have considered the number of discharges and the number of outpatient visits. 
However, in a production process not every output may be classified as desirable, and the 
inclusion of only desirable outputs may not reflect the true technical efficiency of a DMU. In 
the case of hospital efficiency, two clear examples of undesirable outputs are the death of a 
patient during treatment and readmission of patients, both outputs used in some studies as 
proxies for quality of outcome (see, for example, Bilsel and Davutyan, 2011; Arocena and 
Prado, 2007; Sahin and Ozcan, 2000). In this study, we have included in our model those two 
undesirable outputs; in-hospital mortality rate and the ratio between patient readmissions and 
discharges. Further, the four outputs (desirables and undesirables) are case-mix adjusted to 
control for complexity differences between hospitals, using hospitals’ average weights based 
upon the Diagnosis Related Group (DRG) system. A summary of variable definitions and their 
measurement is provided in Table A1 while Table A2 reports descriptive statistics for those 
variables. Hospitals are grouped into ADM or NMM according to their management formula. 
 
Modeling undesirable outputs has been object of considerable discussion in the efficiency 
literature. Following Hua and Bian (2007), when modeling undesirable outputs the choice 
between strong and weak disposability of undesirable outputs has an important effect on DMU’s 
efficiency. Briefly, strong disposability assumes that undesirable outputs are freely disposable, 
i.e., it is possible to reduce undesirable output without any cost, in terms of reducing also 
desirable outputs. On the contrary, weak disposability refers to those situations when a 
reduction of  undesirable output forces a lower production of desirable one, i.e., reducing 
undesirable output is only possible at some cost, in terms of desirable output (for a 
comprehensive overview on this topic see Färe and Grosskopf, 2004).  Here, since we consider 
undesirable outputs also as a proxy for service quality, we assume strong disposability of 
undesirable outputs because intra-hospital mortality rates and re-admission ratios could be 
reduced just by improving service quality and not necessarily at the cost of reducing desirable 
outputs.  
 
Under strong disposability of undesirable outputs, different approaches to deal with those 
outputs have been proposed in the efficiency literature; these approaches have been usually 
classified into direct and indirect ones (Bilsef and Davutyan, 2011). Indirect approaches 
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transform the values of undesirable outputs by a linear monotone decreasing transformation, 
thus transformed undesirable outputs can be treated as desirable (Hua and Bian, 2007). Based on 
the translation invariance property of Banker, Charnes and Cooper (BCC) (1984) models, 
Seiford and Zhu (2002) suggested multiplying each undesirable output (  by (-1) and then 
use a translation vector to convert negative data into non-negative. Mathematically,
 where v is the translation vector which makes  .   
 
Direct approaches avoid data transformation and use the original data. Liu et al. (2010) argued 
that under strong disposability assumptions there is no need to transform the data and, it is 
enough to consider undesirable outputs as desirable inputs. Liu et al. (2010:178) consider this 
approach very effective because of its “simplicity” and “elegance”, although they recognize that 
it may not reflect the true production process since it changes the input-output relationship. 
Because of the lack of consensus in the efficiency literature about the most appropriated 
approach to deal with undesirable factors, under strong disposability of undesirable outputs, we 
define seven different DEA-BCC models, by maintaining all inputs and desirable outputs fixed 
in all models, and combining different approaches to deal with undesirable outputs and the 
number of undesirable outputs
9
. Table A3 reports the seven different models. 
 
Dealing with undesirable outputs is not our only concern; Simar and Wilson (1998, 2000) 
proved that standard DEA estimates may be biased upwards, because of sampling noise 
ignoring issues. To overcome this problem, we employ the DEA homogeneous bootstrap 
methods described in Simar and Wilson (1998, 2000).  
 
Once we get the DEA efficiency scores for the SERMAS general hospitals, we analyze the 
differences in technical efficiency between traditional and new managed hospitals by means of 
two different methodologies; a non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test and an analysis of 
bootstrapped average efficiency confidence intervals computed on the previous stage. 
4. Results 
Table 2 shows results for the standard and bootstrapped DEA models
10
. For each model the first 
column shows the estimates of the relative efficiency scores without bias correction for each 
hospital (βi), while the second column shows bootstrap bias-corrected efficiency scores 
                                                     
9
 Including in our model 3 inputs and 4 outputs may be too close to the so-called “rule of thumb”, so we 
defined also alternative models ignoring undesirable outputs or including just one. 
10
 DEA models computed with the FEAR package developed by Wilson (2008). Bootstrapped efficiency 
scores obtained through 10000 replications. 
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estimates (bias βi). Table A4 reports also estimated standard deviations for each hospital ( . 
Following Simar and Wilson (2000: 790), bias-correction should not be used unless 
, i.e., when the bias-corrected estimator has a lower mean square error than the 
ordinary or standard estimate. To check this, second column of Table A4 shows the ratio = 
, and columns three and four report the estimated 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Because in all cases the mean square error test was passed, we discuss only those results related 
to bias-corrected efficiency scores. A first look at the results does not reveal any clear pattern 
regarding the existence of a relationship between new management formulas and improved 
technical efficiency; in all the models analyzed we found among the “top three” efficient 
hospitals both ADM and NMM hospitals. On average, and considering only models including 
undesirable outputs, the most efficient units are DMUs 17, 20 and 5. DMU 17 is a PFI model 
with a public enterprise managing clinic services and outsourced non-clinic services while 
DMUs 20 and 5 are ADM hospitals. The same applies for the less efficient units; on average the 
less efficient units are DMUs 12, 4 and 15. DMUs 12 and 4 are ADM hospitals while DMU 15 
is a PFI model similar to DMU 17.  Interestingly, the model known as "Alzira model" (DMU 
number 22) —  characterized by a  private management of clinic and non-clinic services— is 
not in any of the estimated models among the “top three” efficient hospitals, which may call 
into question the often-repeated superiority — in terms of efficiency — of this model. 
 
Table 3 compares the average scores of ADM hospitals with NMM hospitals. The average 
efficiency scores show a slightly better performance of NMM hospitals for the seven models 
defined, but that difference does not seem to be statistically significant in any case. We cannot 
reject the null hypothesis that both populations are the same when performing the Mann-
Whitney test in all models. Moreover, average bootstrapped confidence intervals for the 
efficiency of the two groups under analysis overlap to a large degree
11
, thus we do not have 
evidence that the two groups are significantly different as regards technical efficiency. 
Interestingly, a closer look at Table A2 (descriptive statistics) indicates that NMM hospitals are 
much smaller and homogeneous than their ADM counterparts, thus, in principle, more 
manageable and controllable but, this important feature does not seem to make NMM hospitals 
more efficient than their ADM counterparts. 
 
In sum, the results of all seven DEA-bootstrap models and all statistical analysis comparing 
both groups of hospitals, do not reveal any statistical significant different in efficiency between 
                                                     
11
 Efficiency confidence intervals computed with the FEAR package developed by Wilson (2008). 
Individual confidence intervals are reported in Table A4. 
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traditionally managed hospitals and those using new management formulas. Moreover, the fact 
that we find different management models (both ADM and NMM) among hospitals with higher 
— and lower — efficiency scores may suggest that what really matters is the individual hospital 
management, not the management model itself. 
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Table 2. DEA-BCC models results 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
DMU βi bias βi βi bias βi βi bias βi βi bias βi βi bias βi βi bias βi βi bias βi 
1 0.8657 0.7940 0.8657 0.8084 0.8657 0.8037 0.8657 0.8022 0.8657 0.7983 0.8657 0.8114 0.8657 0.8043 
2 0.7711 0.7027 0.8599 0.8011 0.7893 0.7183 0.7849 0.7150 0.7711 0.7049 0.8599 0.8022 0.7893 0.7190 
3 1.0000 0.8950 1.0000 0.9143 1.0000 0.9046 1.0000 0.9051 1.0000 0.8993 1.0000 0.9166 1.0000 0.9061 
4 0.7576 0.6949 0.7648 0.7049 0.7576 0.6998 0.7620 0.7014 0.7576 0.6990 0.7656 0.7067 0.7576 0.6994 
5 1.0000 0.9246 1.0000 0.9340 1.0000 0.9282 1.0000 0.9287 1.0000 0.9100 1.0000 0.9344 1.0000 0.9143 
6 1.0000 0.8951 1.0000 0.9142 1.0000 0.9058 1.0000 0.9038 1.0000 0.9002 1.0000 0.9168 1.0000 0.9061 
7 0.9479 0.9131 0.9500 0.9080 0.9498 0.9018 0.9479 0.9110 0.9479 0.9131 0.9500 0.9072 0.9498 0.9020 
8 0.9081 0.8504 0.9088 0.8608 0.9085 0.8571 0.9118 0.8582 0.9081 0.8516 0.9119 0.8648 0.9085 0.8556 
9 0.8269 0.7812 0.8280 0.7890 0.8271 0.7849 0.8296 0.7831 0.8269 0.7831 0.8296 0.7866 0.8271 0.7844 
10 0.8353 0.7720 0.8361 0.7845 0.8353 0.7783 0.8841 0.8191 0.8488 0.7810 0.8841 0.8271 0.8488 0.7855 
11 1.0000 0.9135 1.0000 0.9270 1.0000 0.9192 1.0000 0.9205 1.0000 0.9175 1.0000 0.9287 1.0000 0.9200 
12 0.7232 0.6871 0.7628 0.7109 0.7259 0.6774 0.7316 0.6911 0.7232 0.6864 0.7646 0.7130 0.7259 0.6771 
13 0.8543 0.7860 0.8804 0.8253 0.8648 0.8006 0.8543 0.7880 0.8543 0.7872 0.8804 0.8256 0.8648 0.8005 
14 0.8942 0.8507 0.9091 0.8633 0.9060 0.8568 0.8964 0.8510 0.8942 0.8505 0.9130 0.8684 0.9060 0.8563 
15 0.7612 0.6907 0.8063 0.7435 0.7836 0.7190 0.7937 0.7219 0.7710 0.7001 0.8063 0.7442 0.7836 0.7176 
16 0.9420 0.8906 1.0000 0.9446 1.0000 0.9246 0.9555 0.9097 0.9458 0.8942 1.0000 0.9450 1.0000 0.9246 
17 0.9912 0.9547 1.0000 0.9304 1.0000 0.9207 0.9912 0.9530 0.9912 0.9537 1.0000 0.9318 1.0000 0.9206 
18 0.8974 0.8398 0.9545 0.9075 0.9456 0.8907 0.8991 0.8427 0.8974 0.8397 0.9545 0.9086 0.9456 0.8911 
19 0.8763 0.8180 1.0000 0.9382 1.0000 0.9285 1.0000 0.9117 1.0000 0.8992 1.0000 0.9216 1.0000 0.9050 
20 0.9196 0.8490 1.0000 0.9457 1.0000 0.9370 1.0000 0.9282 1.0000 0.9187 1.0000 0.9359 1.0000 0.9244 
21 0.9017 0.8353 0.9683 0.9226 0.9623 0.9078 0.9291 0.8768 0.9138 0.8542 0.9683 0.9245 0.9623 0.9080 
22 1.0000 0.8951 1.0000 0.9147 1.0000 0.9054 1.0000 0.9062 1.0000 0.9002 1.0000 0.9162 1.0000 0.9047 
23 1.0000 0.9117 1.0000 0.9145 1.0000 0.9046 1.0000 0.9040 1.0000 0.8986 1.0000 0.9180 1.0000 0.9052 
24 0.8978 0.8246 0.9396 0.8856 0.9251 0.8623 0.9099 0.8461 0.8978 0.8288 0.9396 0.8878 0.9251 0.8625 
25 1.0000 0.8950 1.0000 0.9157 1.0000 0.9045 1.0000 0.9047 1.0000 0.8997 1.0000 0.9167 1.0000 0.9044 
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Table 3. Average bootstrap-DEA results and Mann-Whitney test results 
 
  Mean Score 95 % bootstrapped C.I. U test
a 
Model 1 ADM .8160214 .7671357 .8804786 -1.134 (.189) 
 NMM .8582273 .8052545 .9227273  
Model 2 ADM .8496071 .7948 .9077714 -.931 (.352) 
 NMM .8922 .8340818 .9503182  
Model 3 ADM .8337286 .7776071 .8978286 -.1095 (.273) 
 NMM .8790364 .8162364 .9448182  
Model 4 ADM .8352357 .7804571 .9010429 -.766 (.443) 
 NMM .8718091 .8169818 .9317273  
Model 5 ADM .8270357 .7683286 .8962429 -.876 (.381) 
 NMM .8627909 .8078909 .9254364  
Model 6 ADM .8516429 .7957929 .9115143 -1.204 (.228) 
 NMM .8942545 .8363182 .9509727  
Model 7 ADM .8308286 .7696429 .8988143 -1.396 (1.63) 
 NMM .8788273 .8165364 .9449091  
Note: a Z values for Mann-Whitney test. Test significance in parenthesis. 
 
Conclusions  
As a consequence of rising healthcare expenditures and the ongoing economic crisis, the issue 
of public healthcare sector efficiency is once again on top of the policy agenda across many 
regional governments in Spain. Despite of the lack of conclusive empirical evidence, the 
adoption of NPM-related policies in healthcare management is still on the rise. 
 
This paper sought to assess whether the use of new managerial tools led to improvements in 
technical efficiency for a sample of 25 hospitals belonging to the SERMAS. Our results suggest 
that there is no difference in terms of technical efficiency between traditionally managed 
hospitals and those adopting new management formulas and, there are always different 
management models among the more — and less — efficient hospitals. These findings 
remained unchanged when using different DEA models and different statistics analysis, calling 
into question if what actually matters is the management model or, on the contrary, particular 
managers’ practices.  
 
What policy lessons can be extracted from our findings? Firstly, since we do not find any 
evidence of efficiency gains by adopting NPM-related policies in Madrid’s public hospitals, we 
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suggest that, policymakers should be extremely cautious when adopting these policies, 
particularly those involving the private sector, such as different forms of PPPs. If a private firm 
does not generate profits by improving the efficiency, profit maximization incentives may have 
a downward effect on service quality, especially when service quality is difficult to measure 
(Hart et al., 1997). Moreover, in a non-efficiency gains scenario, private firms may have strong 
incentives to raise the prices charged to governments when renegotiating contracts (the so-called 
“hold up” effect
12
) and/or contracts may become, financially speaking, unviable, leading to 
government bailouts. This is already happening: first, in 2010 the PFI hospitals from Madrid 
already needed a government bailout (Sanchez et al., 2013). Then, in 2011, El País (10 May 
2011) published a letter addressed to the Madrid’s health commissioner, in which the private 
firms operating the seven PFI hospitals from Madrid attempted to renegotiate their contracts, 
warning about the collapse of all seven PFI hospitals due to unforeseen events, such as the 
application of a new Accountability Plan in 2011.  
 
In this light, two questions arise: which are the real drivers of healthcare reforms in Madrid? Is 
the goal of healthcare reform to improve the efficiency of Madrid public healthcare, rather than 
being motivated by “regulatory capture” issues? Following Laffont and Tirole (1991:1091), 
regulators — in our context policymakers — may be “captured” or influenced by interest groups 
hoping for future employment within the regulated firms, effect known as the “revolving door”. 
In this sense, there is clear evidence of “revolving doors” in the SERMAS (see El País, 10 
December 2012). Also, in June 2013, a Court from Madrid has opened an investigation to 
clarify whether the existence of “revolving doors” may have influenced the adoption of 
measures in favor of some private healthcare companies (Juzgado de Instrucción nº4 de 
Madrid- Diligencias previas 2052/2013). Movements between the private and public sector do 
not have to be necessarily harmful when done in a transparent way without conflict of interest, 
but this may have negative consequences, in terms of social welfare, if policies are motivated by 
the hope of future personal gains instead of the optimum outcome for the general interest 
(Pollock et al., 2006). 
 
Finally, though we have presented efficiency estimates for the sample of Madrid hospitals and 
health policy implications, these conclusions must be interpreted with caution in view of some 
limitations of this study such as sample size and data limitations. Small sample size prevented 
                                                     
12
 When contracts are highly complex or incomplete, governments may need to renegotiate the contract in 
the case of an unforeseen problem or event. This not only has costs, it also gives the private firm – with 
its incentives to maximize profits – to raise the prices charged to governments (Jensen and Stonecash, 
2005) 
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us from including additional input and output measures which may better reflect the true 
hospital production process. In addition, the cross-section nature of the data does not permit us 
to analyze efficiency changes over time which may of interest when analyzing healthcare 
reform effects. Next steps for future research include overcome some of these limitations by 
employing additional years as soon as new data is available. It would be of interest also to 
answer one of the questions raised from this study; the drivers of healthcare reform 
implementation in Spain, with a particular focus on the following issue: is there any correlation 
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Appendix A: Supplementary tables 
 
Table A1. Variable definitions and explanations 
 
Variable Definition and explanations 
Inputs  
Beds Total number of hospitals’ beds 
Physicians Total number of physicians who are full time  employees plus total number 
of physicians who are part time employees weighted by 0.5 
Nursing staff Total number of nursing staff who are full time  employees plus total 
number of nursing staff who are part time employees weighted by 0.5 
Desirable Outputs  
Discharges Total number of case-mix adjusted recovery discharges   
Outpatient visits Total number of case-mix adjusted outpatient visits, including emergencies 
Undesirable outputs  
Mortality rate Share of total number of in-hospital dead patients to total number of case-
mix adjusted admissions 
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Table A2. Descriptive statistics 
  Mean Std. Deviation Min Max 
Beds Total 455.88 414.6714 77 1453 
 ADM 607.6429 486.5422 77 1453 
 NMM 262.7273 177.9377 83 569 
Physicians Total 403.44 297.3928 74 1079 
 ADM 496.8214 351.6871 74 1079 
 NMM 284.5909 154.0365 137.5 592 
Nursing staff Total 727.9 636.148 126 2387 
 ADM 939.75 763.2871 126 2387 
 NMM 458.2727 266.5548 212.5 1114 
Discharges Total 32212.52 27892.4 4348.72 98043.78 
 ADM 41286.08 32793.16 4348.72 98043.78 
 NMM 20664.35 14394.44 6926.37 48761.76 
Outpatient visits Total 521288.3 392398 89865.92 1368891 
 ADM 551617 419789.2 89865.92 1238626 
 NMM 482688.2 370845.5 193354 1368891 
Mortality rate Total 2.06428 .5240246 1.179493 3.433322 
 ADM 1.979494 .4911567 1.179493 2.780687 
 NMM 2.172189 .567949 1.413293 3.433322 
Readmissions rate Total 5.174021 1.215448 1.936325 6.586897 
 ADM 4.929406 1.572037 1.936325 6.586897 
 NMM 5.48535 .3774613 4.888784 6.116265 
Notes: ADM- Traditional administrative direct management. NMM-New management models 
 
Table A3. Different DEA-BCC models 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Inputs 
       Beds x x x x x x x 
Doctors x x x x x x x 
Nursing x x x x x x x 
Outputs 
       Discharges x x x x x x x 
Outpatients x x x x x x x 
Undesirable Outputs 






   
x x x x 
 
Notes: Model 1 ignores undesirable outputs. Models 2, 4 and 6 treat undesirable outputs as normal inputs. 
Models 3, 5 and 7 use a linear transformation to deal with undesirable outputs. 
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Table A4. Efficiency scores’ standard deviations and confidence intervals 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
DMU σi ri LowCI HighCI σi ri LowCI HighCI σi ri LowCI HighCI σi ri LowCI HighCI 
1 0.0032 166.88 0.7279 0.8627 0.0023 206.17 0.7449 0.8635 0.0026 189.55 0.7401 0.8631 0.0026 198.83 0.7376 0.8631 
2 0.0018 481.33 0.6806 0.7679 0.002 288.12 0.7442 0.8577 0.003 186.70 0.6746 0.7865 0.0023 307.00 0.6857 0.7823 
3 0.0058 109.04 0.7849 0.9957 0.0044 126.16 0.8071 0.9969 0.0054 103.82 0.792 0.9959 0.0051 115.17 0.7956 0.9965 
4 0.0013 775.40 0.6831 0.7545 0.0013 707.69 0.6903 0.7626 0.0011 920.34 0.6877 0.7551 0.0011 1008.33 0.6896 0.7591 
5 0.0016 738.29 0.8662 0.9957 0.0015 643.38 0.8746 0.9969 0.0017 592.95 0.8692 0.9962 0.0016 660.08 0.8706 0.9962 
6 0.0058 108.83 0.7866 0.9958 0.0044 126.45 0.8066 0.9968 0.0053 105.08 0.7913 0.9966 0.0052 113.85 0.7931 0.9962 
7 0.0003 4485.33 0.8811 0.9442 0.0004 3657.52 0.8759 0.947 0.0006 2124.45 0.8632 0.9463 0.0003 5015.70 0.8817 0.9445 
8 0.0016 433.50 0.7957 0.9046 0.0011 632.07 0.8088 0.9062 0.0013 519.07 0.8036 0.9053 0.0014 486.78 0.8033 0.9085 
9 0.0006 1933.79 0.7597 0.8234 0.0005 2028.00 0.7688 0.8254 0.0005 2374.45 0.7649 0.8238 0.0006 1993.48 0.7652 0.8264 
10 0.0018 410.93 0.7368 0.8316 0.0013 523.13 0.7469 0.8336 0.0016 421.56 0.7406 0.8324 0.0016 550.13 0.7764 0.8808 
11 0.0027 341.33 0.8392 0.9958 0.0023 334.87 0.8522 0.9971 0.0026 321.13 0.8433 0.9964 0.0024 364.84 0.8474 0.9965 
12 0.0004 2715.02 0.6833 0.7207 0.0008 1402.92 0.7034 0.7606 0.0006 2169.04 0.6748 0.7233 0.0004 3417.19 0.6892 0.7291 
13 0.0013 920.10 0.7632 0.8512 0.0009 1249.39 0.7997 0.8775 0.0012 951.11 0.7733 0.8619 0.0013 867.00 0.7638 0.8512 
14 0.0005 2511.41 0.8273 0.8905 0.0005 2784.65 0.8371 0.9061 0.0006 2232.23 0.8302 0.9026 0.0005 2748.21 0.8277 0.893 
15 0.0018 509.89 0.6741 0.7581 0.0017 453.44 0.7119 0.804 0.0019 384.14 0.6893 0.7808 0.0021 388.58 0.6937 0.7906 
16 0.0007 1797.25 0.8567 0.938 0.0009 1258.47 0.8958 0.9967 0.002 472.51 0.861 0.9968 0.0005 2796.85 0.8754 0.9523 
17 0.0003 4934.26 0.9219 0.9868 0.0017 557.12 0.8756 0.9969 0.0023 395.25 0.8561 0.996 0.0004 3040.08 0.9177 0.9874 
18 0.001 1102.08 0.806 0.8932 0.0006 2036.68 0.8707 0.9516 0.0008 1569.80 0.8496 0.9418 0.001 1056.56 0.807 0.8961 
19 0.0015 503.54 0.7747 0.8729 0.0015 563.98 0.8678 0.9967 0.002 424.83 0.8468 0.9964 0.0036 200.08 0.8197 0.9965 
20 0.0019 458.93 0.7951 0.9155 0.001 979.21 0.8881 0.9968 0.0012 915.84 0.8785 0.9959 0.0018 528.90 0.8653 0.9962 
21 0.0015 653.18 0.7893 0.8978 0.0007 1414.53 0.8769 0.965 0.001 986.45 0.8574 0.9588 0.0009 1125.63 0.8322 0.9258 
22 0.0057 112.68 0.7884 0.9954 0.0043 130.86 0.808 0.9968 0.0052 110.09 0.7914 0.9963 0.005 117.06 0.7955 0.9961 
23 0.0032 253.23 0.818 0.9952 0.0043 131.48 0.8078 0.9967 0.0054 103.82 0.7906 0.9963 0.0052 113.37 0.7933 0.9963 
24 0.0022 368.02 0.7726 0.894 0.0012 675.00 0.8313 0.9363 0.0017 453.44 0.8054 0.9216 0.0017 468.02 0.7938 0.9065 
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25 0.0058 109.04 0.7853 0.9955 0.0043 127.81 0.8077 0.9969 0.0054 104.04 0.7902 0.9965 0.0052 111.72 0.7927 0.9964 
Table A4. Efficiency scores’ standard deviations and confidence intervals (continued) 
 
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
DMU σi ri LowCI HighCI σi ri LowCI HighCI σi ri LowCI HighCI 
1 0.003 167.75 0.7315 0.8631 0.002 245.71 0.752 0.8635 0.0026 185.29 0.738 0.8633 
2 0.0017 505.47 0.6833 0.7685 0.0019 307.41 0.7487 0.8575 0.0028 209.53 0.6764 0.7864 
3 0.0056 107.57 0.7874 0.9961 0.0042 131.12 0.8085 0.9972 0.0052 108.46 0.7926 0.9964 
4 0.0011 945.99 0.6861 0.7546 0.0012 803.06 0.6915 0.763 0.001 1125.20 0.6889 0.7549 
5 0.0035 219.92 0.823 0.9964 0.0016 558.63 0.8748 0.9971 0.0033 224.28 0.8285 0.9964 
6 0.0055 109.53 0.7875 0.9958 0.0042 130.49 0.8077 0.997 0.0052 108.46 0.7919 0.9966 
7 0.0003 4485.33 0.8834 0.9442 0.0005 2431.05 0.8749 0.9472 0.0006 2106.75 0.8637 0.9465 
8 0.0015 472.93 0.7972 0.9046 0.0011 611.13 0.8143 0.9092 0.0013 551.95 0.8023 0.9052 
9 0.0006 1776.33 0.7633 0.8235 0.0005 2453.88 0.7697 0.827 0.0005 2431.05 0.7655 0.824 
10 0.0022 315.65 0.7358 0.8456 0.0013 638.58 0.7883 0.8815 0.002 332.85 0.7404 0.8458 
11 0.0026 334.80 0.8435 0.9966 0.0022 349.14 0.855 0.9969 0.0026 314.79 0.8446 0.9963 
12 0.0003 4988.48 0.6833 0.7206 0.0007 1804.25 0.7068 0.7621 0.0006 2196.01 0.6753 0.7237 
13 0.0013 885.40 0.7632 0.8513 0.0008 1558.38 0.8012 0.8773 0.0012 954.08 0.7752 0.8615 
14 0.0004 3960.33 0.8281 0.8911 0.0005 2652.21 0.8413 0.91 0.0006 2287.12 0.8303 0.9029 
15 0.002 417.72 0.6771 0.7675 0.0017 443.37 0.7126 0.8038 0.0019 402.22 0.6872 0.7807 
16 0.0007 1804.25 0.8591 0.9416 0.0009 1240.33 0.898 0.9969 0.002 472.51 0.8626 0.9964 
17 0.0003 5208.33 0.9194 0.9873 0.0017 534.90 0.8768 0.997 0.0023 396.25 0.8566 0.9966 
18 0.0011 913.98 0.8032 0.8942 0.0006 1950.75 0.8723 0.9512 0.0009 1222.33 0.849 0.9421 
19 0.0055 111.74 0.7874 0.9958 0.0032 199.57 0.8322 0.9972 0.0053 106.87 0.7913 0.9962 
20 0.0022 454.09 0.8523 0.9953 0.0015 606.81 0.8749 0.9971 0.0021 430.86 0.8554 0.9961 
21 0.0012 819.50 0.8089 0.9104 0.0007 1305.06 0.8788 0.9656 0.001 979.21 0.8585 0.9589 
22 0.0056 105.66 0.7878 0.9965 0.0042 132.38 0.8075 0.9965 0.0052 111.72 0.7921 0.9964 
23 0.0056 109.07 0.7874 0.9962 0.0042 126.75 0.8089 0.9968 0.0053 106.42 0.7927 0.9962 
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24 0.0021 358.82 0.775 0.8942 0.0011 739.18 0.8352 0.9366 0.0016 510.26 0.8068 0.9219 
25 0.0055 110.63 0.7892 0.9962 0.0041 137.26 0.8087 0.9967 0.0054 104.26 0.7911 0.996 
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